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I. INTRODUCTION
Our nation was founded on the premise that the door will be equally
open to all.1 Yet, for much of the nation’s history, children of color were
* Kristina M. Campbell received her J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center in May
2011, graduating summa cum laude. She received a B.B.A. in Accounting from Texas A&M University in May 2008, graduating cum laude. Ms. Campbell wishes to thank Professor Craig Joyce of the
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not allowed to attend school with white children, and were instead required
to attend separate, often ill-equipped schools.2 The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and its explicit mandate that no state shall deny to any
person the equal protection of the laws3 began a commitment to colorblindness by the Court.4 With this commitment, the Court abandoned the
notion that separate could be “equal” in education.5
It is against this background that former Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor’s impact on the Court’s race and education jurisprudence is
noteworthy. During her tenure, Justice O’Connor maintained a firm commitment to both equality and the ability of students to receive an excellent
and diverse education.6 While this commitment is significant, it is Justice
O’Connor’s embrace of strict scrutiny judicial review in all cases of racebased decision-making by state actors, first as a dissenting member of the
Court and finally as a leader of the majority of the Court,7 that is Justice
O’Connor’s greatest contribution to the Court’s race and education jurisprudence.8
This paper explores the impact of Justice O’Connor on the Court’s race
and education jurisprudence, both in the context of primary through secondary school education and in public universities. Section II outlines
Justice O’Connor’s biography and explores several external influences on
the Justice. Section III reviews the Court’s race and education jurisprudence prior to Justice O’Connor’s appointment to the Court. Section IV
exposes the Court’s jurisprudence in this area during Justice O’Connor’s
time on the Court, with an emphasis on those opinions authored by Justice
O’Connor. Section V offers an analysis of the aftermath of Justice
O’Connor’s race and education jurisprudence, beginning with Section
V(A) addressing the state of the law after Justice O’Connor’s majority
University of Houston Law Center, who teaches an annual seminar on the contributions of Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, for his inspiration and assistance in writing this paper, the editors of this Law
Review for their careful editing of this paper, and finally, Ben Williams, for his encouragement and
support.
1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 259 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (stating “the door
ought to be equally open to all”).
2. See infra notes 48–64 and accompanying text (describing cases that allowed for separate education).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Kristina M. Campbell, Note, Will Equal Again Mean Equal?: Understanding Ricci v.
DeStefano, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 385, 387 & nn.6–7 (2010) (noting the Court’s response to the 14th
Amendment).
5. See infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board
of Education).
6. See infra Section IV (examining Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence on the Court).
7. See infra Section IV (tracing this evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence).
8. See Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative Action under
Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 245-46 (2011) (“The key jurist on affirmative action has been
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.”).
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opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger. Section V(B) discusses the Court’s race
and education jurisprudence following Justice O’Connor’s tenure, primarily through an analysis of Parents Involved in Community Schools. Finally,
Section V(C) hypothesizes the future of race-conscious decision-making in
education and Justice O’Connor’s legacy through the lens of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. Section VI concludes this paper.
II.

ABOUT JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR

Sandra Day O’Connor was born in March 1930 and grew up on a cattle
ranch on the Arizona-New Mexico border, known as “Lazy B.”9 She attended the private Radford School for Girls in El Paso, Texas, beginning at
age six, and she spent the academic semesters living with her grandmother
in El Paso.10 During her vacations from school, Sandra returned to Lazy B
and worked alongside the rest of the family.11 After she graduated from
high school, she attended Stanford University in California.12 Sandra then
attended law school at Stanford, where she was an outstanding student and
member of the Law Review.13 She met her husband, John O’Connor, during law school.14 After law school, Sandra practiced law in both the public
and private sectors, and in many ways, she settled for whatever work she
could secure as a female lawyer.15 She became involved in politics in the
1960s, first in the local Republican Party, and eventually as an Arizona
Senator.16 In 1975, Sandra was elected to a state trial judgeship in Arizona, and in 1979, she joined the Arizona Court of Appeals.17 In 1981, she
was nominated to the United States Supreme Court by President Reagan,
and she was confirmed as the first female Justice on the Court that same
year.18 In 2006, Justice O’Connor retired from the Court.19

9. JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT
BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 11 (2006).
10. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 16. Sandra attended a local public school in New Mexico, twenty
miles from Lazy B, for her eighth grade year. However, she returned to Radford for the rest of her
secondary education. Id. at 19.
11. Id. at 19–20.
12. Id at 22.
13. Id.at 25–26.
14. Id.at 26–27.
15. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 28–30.
16. See id. at 31 (noting her involvement in the local Republican Party), 35 (noting her experience in
the Arizona Senate).
17. See id. at 65–66 (noting her state trial judgeship), at 68 (noting her appointment to the state
Court of Appeals).
18. Id. at 98.
19. Craig Joyce, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1271 (2006).
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Before delving into the opinions Justice O’Connor authored during her
time on the Court, it is first useful to examine her writings, both reflective
and analytical, to gain insight into her judicial philosophy. First, Justice
O’Connor’s writings evidence her strong belief in the importance of education, not only for the individual, but also for the American democracy.20
Of note, she attended school in El Paso, not in Arizona where her immediate family lived, as a result of the poor primary and secondary education
available in rural Arizona at the time.21 Her family encouraged her to pursue higher education, including law school, a not entirely common experience for a woman at the time.22 These experiences provided her with the
educational background necessary to succeed, first as a lawyer and later as
a Supreme Court Justice. Consequently, Justice O’Connor not only appreciated education, but greatly benefited from it.
Justice O’Connor’s writings also evidence a unique understanding of
the impact of race in the United States.23 In a 1992 article published in the
Stanford Law Review, entitled “Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a
Raconteur,” Justice O’Connor wrote of when Thurgood Marshall changed
the nation through Brown v. Board of Education.24 O’Connor reflects that
she had not been personally exposed to racial tensions before Brown, as
Arizona did not have a large African American population during her
childhood, and further, unlike many southern states, Arizona had never
adopted a de jure system of segregation.25 Even though O’Connor spent
her eighth-grade year in a predominantly Latino public school in New
Mexico, she has written that she never had a personal sense of being a minority in a culture that cared much more for the majority.26 Additionally,
during her childhood, Justice O’Connor’s father employed a Mexican
American cowboy, “Rastus,” on the family ranch.27 Justice O’Connor
speaks highly of Rastus in her writings, noting that he became part of the
family, and admiring the high standards he set for himself and those

20. See SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 274 (Craig Joyce ed., 2004) (noting
the effects of an educated society).
21. See BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 16 (noting the limited educational opportunities available near
Lazy B).
22. See id. at 22 (discussing her attendance at Stanford).
23. See infra notes 24–30, 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s comments).
24. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1217, 1217 (1992) (“It was through Brown v. Board of Education that [Justice Marshall] compelled us,
as a nation, to come to grips with some of the contradictions within ourselves.”).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE RANCH IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 53 (2003).
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around him, both professionally and personally.28 Despite the roadblocks
Rastus faced—“being small, crippled, fatherless, a minority race in his
birthland”—Justice O’Connor has reflected that Rastus “played the hand
he was dealt like a master” and found respect.29 Despite not being personally exposed to the type of discrimination the children in Brown experienced in segregated schools, Justice O’Connor was shaped by the personal
experiences of Justice Marshall and others as they shared their own trials
with her.30
While Justice O’Connor did not experience discrimination based on
her race in educational or career opportunities, she did experience discrimination as a result of her gender.31 When she was on Lazy B with her family, young Sandra Day was expected to, and did, contribute to the same
degree as the men in her family, even participating in roundups.32 Further,
when she attended Stanford University in the late 1940s, she joined some
two thousand female students, which constituted nearly a quarter of enrolled undergraduates.33 Her husband appreciated her independence and
ambition, a rarity in the 1950s.34 However, she had significant difficulties
securing her first job after law school, as firms would only hire women as
legal secretaries, instead of as practicing lawyers.35 Justice O’Connor’s
experiences led her to champion better job opportunities for women and
equal pay for equal work as a state senator.36 As a Justice on the Supreme
Court, she noted that what was important about her appointment was “not
that [she would] decide cases as a woman, but that she [is] a woman who
will get to decide cases.”37
Justice O’Connor’s writings evidence a deep understanding of the discrimination many have felt in pursuing opportunities, particularly resulting
from race and gender discrimination.38 Further, her writings evidence a
strong belief that the framers drafted a Constitution that held the promise
28. O’CONNOR, supra note 27, at 58–59.
29. Id.
30. O’Connor, supra note 25, at 1217; see also O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 135–36 (recounting
Justice Marshall’s stories).
31. O’Connor, supra note 25, at 1219.
32. See, e.g., O’CONNOR, supra note 27, at 96 (noting Justice O’Connor’s participation in the previously all-male roundups).
33. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 22.
34. See id.at 28 (“But she must have known the deeper commitment she was winning from a 1950s
husband: an appreciation of her independence and ambition and a willingness to sacrifice some of his
own drive for hers.”).
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting Justice O’Connor’s experiences with gender
discrimination).
36. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 52.
37. Id.at 103.
38. See generally O’Connor, supra note 25 (Justice O’Connor discussing her own experiences and
the stories Justice Marshall shared with her).
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of equality.39 This awareness is joined by an assumption of responsibility
for narrowing the gap between “the ideal of equal justice and the reality of
social inequality.”40 In her writings, Justice O’Connor has expressed a
great respect for the dedication and commitment to the Constitution of the
many judges that shaped the struggle for civil rights, particularly in the
battle over the desegregation of schools.41
Justice O’Connor’s story is impressive, as she rose from humble beginnings on a cattle ranch to the first woman appointed to the United States
Supreme Court.42 Her writings and jurisprudence evidence a deep commitment to equality and education and a profound respect for the role of
the Court.43 A searching review of her biography and the opinions she
authored suggest that her jurisprudence is perhaps no accident; rather, her
experiences shaped her rulings as a member of the Court.44 The following
sections will note these correlations in the larger context of an exploration
and analysis of Justice O’Connor’s race and education jurisprudence.45
III. RACE AND EDUCATION JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JUSTICE
O’CONNOR’S APPOINTMENT
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the
laws.46
Before exploring Justice O’Connor’s impact on the Court’s race and
education jurisprudence, it is first useful to explore the Court’s jurisprudence in this area prior to Justice O’Connor’s appointment to the Court.
As such, this section will trace the Court’s race and education jurisprudence, both in higher education and in the K-12 context, from the ratification of the Constitution to Justice O’Connor’s appointment in 1981.47
39. See O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 268 (noting the “Framers’ promises of equality”).
40. O’Connor, supra note 25, at 1218.
41. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1990); see also O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 246 (noting that the Court took “a
leading role in the issue of race relations in the United States”).
42. See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text (outlining Justice O’Connor’s background and
experiences).
43. See supra notes 20–41 and accompanying text (exploring various writings by Justice O’Connor).
44. See generally Joyce, supra note 19 (suggesting such a connection).
45. Infra Section V.
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
47. Infra Section III.
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Education has historically been a matter belonging to the states, and
absent “clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme
law of the land,” the early Court was especially reluctant to interfere.48 In
this deferential spirit, the early 20th century Court upheld state laws49 that
authorized maintenance of separate schools for children of the white and
colored races50 and made teaching children of all races together illegal, in
both public and private schools.51
Despite this deferential approach, the Court began to place some limit
on the states’ ability to discriminate under the Fourteenth Amendment in
the late 1930s.52 In Missouri v. Canada,53 the Court noted that the constitutional permissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment of
state privileges was dependent upon equal privileges being given to the
separated groups in the state.54 Resort to opportunities elsewhere was not
enough to mitigate a state’s discrimination; rather, the Court required that
the State itself provide equal, even if separate, opportunities.55 Because
Missouri provided a law school only for its white citizens, the Court found
that its actions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.56
In the 1950s, the Court began to define this notion of equal opportunity
in the education context.57 In Sweatt v. Painter,58 the Court held that the
state providing one law school for whites and one law school for colored
students was not enough; rather, there must be “substantial equality” in the
educational opportunities.59 The Court looked to the number and reputation of faculty, experience of the administration, variety of courses, size of
the student body, scope of the library, availability of student activities, and

48. See Cumming v. Cnty, Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (“the education of the people in
schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective states”).
49. While the Court most often reviewed cases wherein a state law explicitly authorized separation
of the races, the Court treated cases where such a policy was intended similarly. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 344 (1938) (noting the intended policy “to separate the white and negro races”).
50. Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 82, 87 (1927). “Colored races” has been used to refer not only to
children of African American dissent, but also of the “brown, yellow, and black races”—essentially, to
all non-Caucasian races. Id. at 82.
51. Brea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908).
52. Infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
53. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
54. Id. at 349.
55. See id. at 350 (“Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be
performed only where its laws operates.”).
56. Id. at 352; see also Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (holding that the State must provide a legal education for colored students if it provides such an education
for white students).
57. Infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
58. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
59. Id. at 633–34.
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standing in the community to measure equality.60 Finding significant discrepancies in the two law schools, the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause required that the colored law student petitioner be admitted to the
state’s white law school.61 That same year in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents for Higher Education,62 the Court held that once a student was
admitted to a state-supported graduate school, even if he was of a different
race than the majority of other students, the state must afford the student
the same treatment as students of other races.63 As a result, it became clear
by the early 1950s that outer appearance of equality was not enough; rather, the Constitution required the states to provide truly equal opportunities to its students.64
By the mid-1950s, the Court’s growing insistence on actual, substantive equality set the stage for its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.65 Because all tangible measures before the Court indicated that
the primary and secondary schools that white and colored children attended
in Kansas were equal, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications
and salaries of teachers, and other factors, the Court was squarely faced
with the question of whether segregation solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities,
even if tangible factors are equal.66 The Court found that it did and that in
the field of public education, “the doctrine of separate but equal has no
place.”67 Brown clarified the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment—that
no state can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”68 In subsequent cases, the Court reinforced this holding, noting that state governments and school boards alike were bound by Brown.69
After Brown, the nationwide system of segregated schools and an entire set of practices that denied citizens rights on account of their race conflicted with the Court’s command of equality.70 The Court had many opportunities to clarify the implications of its holding that, legally, separate
was no longer equal as plaintiffs challenged the policies of their state gov-

60. Id.
61. Id. at 636.
62. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
63. Id. at 642.
64. Supra notes 59 and 63 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s requirement that the plaintiffs
receive truly equal educational opportunities).
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. Id. at 492–93.
67. Id. at 495.
68. O’Connor, supra note 41, at 11.
69. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
70. O’Connor, supra note 41, at 11.
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ernments and local school boards.71 The Court struck down school board
policies that allowed students, upon request, to transfer to another school
solely on the basis of its racial composition72 and held that counties could
not close all public schools when the result would be unequal education
opportunities at private schools.73
By the mid-1960s, the Court noted that the time for mere deliberate
speed in desegregation had run out74 and remnants of unequal education
must be remedied immediately.75 Where plaintiffs could prove that a current condition of segregated schooling existed and was compelled or authorized by state action, the Court imposed on states the “affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”76 Even
if the segregation resulted from free transfer policies77 or statutes forbidding educational decisions based on race,78 rather than through designated
separate schools, the Court found that, in each case, the state’s complacent
actions violated the Equal Protection Clause.79 The Court sanctioned district court orders requiring certain numbers of minority teachers and staff
members per school,80 the drawing of geographic attendance zones to
achieve greater racial balance,81 and the use of mathematical ratios of white
to black students82 as reasonable steps toward eliminating discrimination.
Finally, the Court held that schools could not deny admission to prospective students because they were not white.83
However, by the mid-1970s, the Court began to limit the duty of states
to address racial discrepancies in education, noting that federal remedial
71. See, e.g., infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (highlighting such cases).
72. Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963) (“The recognition of race as an absolute criterion for granting transfers which operate only in the direction of schools in which the transferee’s race is
in the majority is no less unconstitutional than its use for original admission or subsequent assignment
to public schools.”).
73. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964).
74. Id. at 234.
75. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 199 (1965).
76. Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 391 U.S. 450, 458 (1968) (citing Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 437–38 (1968)).
77. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 440; Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
78. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45–46 (1971). The Court noted: “To forbid, at
this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school authorities of the one tool
absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school
systems.” Id. at 46.
79. Id.; Green, 391 U.S. at 440; Monroe, 391 U.S. at 459 (1968).
80. United States v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 236 (1969).
81. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971).
82. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) (approving such ratios
as “starting point[s]”).
83. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (“It is apparent that the racial exclusion
practiced by the Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe’s Private School amounts to a classic violation of
[28 U.S.C.] 1981.”).
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power may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation, and
as with any equity case, the nature of the violation would determine the
scope of the remedy.84 In Milliken v. Bradley,85 the Court held that before
imposing cross-district school remedies, the plaintiff must first show that
there has been a constitutional violation within one district that has produced a significant segregative effect in another district.86 Remedies must
be designed to restore the victims of discrimination, not as a justification to
consider race in the placement of students.87 Finally, in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,88 a plurality of the Court found that the
University’s Medical School admissions process, which reserved 16 out of
the available 100 positions in the class for minority applicants, was impermissible.89 Amongst several splintered opinions, four different members of
the Court joined Justice Powell in finding that the State could consider race
in admissions, provided that such consideration is devised to achieve a
diverse student body within the University.90 Bakke has been said to mark
the Court’s “retreat from race,” as the Court began to substantially limit
states’ efforts to address racial discrepancies in schools.91
By 1980, the Court firmly established that separate was no longer
equal in the context of education and that remedying past discrimination
was a compelling government interest.92 The Court heard several cases in
which school districts had refused to undo years of segregation, but the
Court was just beginning to establish the boundaries for the ability of states
to consider race in the context of education.93 It is against this background

84. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 300).
85. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717.
86. Id. at 744–45; see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455, 467 (1979) (allowing for system-wide remedy because the school board’s segregative actions impacted the entire system); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (finding that the system-wide remedy fashioned by the district court went beyond the scope of the “three instances of segregative action”).
87. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746 (“[T]he remedy is necessarily designed . . . to restore the victims
of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.”).
88. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
89. See id. at 271 (affirming the California court’s holding that the University’s special admissions
program was unlawful). Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens concurred in this part of Justice
Powell’s opinion. Id.
90. Justice Powell was joined in this part of his opinion by justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Id. at 272. Justice Powell argued that race or ethnic background could be used as “simply
one element—to be weighed fairly against other elements—in the selection process,” but no other
members of the Court joined that part of his opinion. Id. at 318. Justice Powell urged for the application of “the most exacting scrutiny” to this type of case, and four members of the Court chose to apply
“strict scrutiny.” Compare id. at 291 (Powell, J.) with id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, J.).
91. Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 971 (2010).
92. See supra Section III (tracing the Court’s jurisprudence before Justice O’Connor’s appointment
to the Court).
93. See supra note 70–91 and accompanying text (exploring the Court’s jurisprudence after Brown).
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that Justice O’Connor was appointed to the Court and grappled with leaving her mark on the Court’s race and education jurisprudence.94
IV. THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE DURING JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S
TENURE
When Justice O’Connor joined the Court in 1981, the Court no longer
subscribed to the notion that separate is equal.95 Yet, the Court had not yet
formalized this commitment to equality by applying the strictest level of
judicial review to each instance of discrimination.96 By the end of Justice
O’Connor’s tenure, however, the Court firmly adopted strict judicial review in all claims of race-conscious decision making by state actors.97
This section will trace this evolution of the Court’s race and education jurisprudence during Justice O’Connor’s time on the Court.98
A. Early Cases
During the earliest years of Justice O’Connor’s time on the Court, the
Court was frequently faced with the difficult question of how far a state
could—or should—go in remedying discrepancies between the races in
public schools.99 In Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los
Angeles,100 Justice O’Connor joined the majority in holding that the State
could amend its Constitution to provide no further remedies than those
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, and further, that the State was not
required to provide pupil-school assignment or pupil transportation where
segregation that violates the Equal Protection Clause did not exist.101
However, unlike in Crawford, a majority of the Court in Washington v.
Seattle School District No. 1102 invalidated a facially neutral state statute
that prohibited school assignment on the basis of race, on the grounds that

94. See infra Section IV (discussing significant cases in this area during Justice O’Connor’s time on
the Court).
95. Supra note 67 and accompanying text.
96. See supra Section III (discussing the Court’s race and education holdings prior to Justice
O’Connor’s appointment).
97. Infra notes 123–162 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s continued application of strict
scrutiny).
98. Infra Section IV.
99. See generally, e.g., Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 542, 545.
102. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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it violated the Equal Protection Clause.103 Four members of the Court dissented in Washington, including Justice O’Connor, arguing that the school
districts had no federal constitutional obligation to adopt mandatory busing
programs, and as such, could enact legislation that did not allow students to
be assigned on the basis of race.104
Although Justice O’Connor’s votes in Crawford and Washington evidence a view that a states’ responsibility to combat racial discrepancies in
public schools is limited to remedying violations of the Equal Protection
Clause,105 there is no doubt that she believed that children’s inability to
receive an education in a racially integrated school was “one of the most
serious injuries recognized in our legal system.”106 In Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,107 a plurality of the Court applied strict scrutiny review to the school board’s actions and held that the school board’s policy
of extending preferential protection against layoffs to some employees
because of their race violated the Fourteenth Amendment.108 Justice
O’Connor wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, embracing strict scrutiny review of any type of racial classification
but applying the narrowly tailored component of the analysis differently
than the rest of the plurality.109 Justice O’Connor subscribed to Justice
Powell’s formulation of strict scrutiny in his plurality opinion—that racial
classification must be justified by a compelling government interest and
the means chosen by the state to effectuate its purpose must be narrowly
tailored.110 Foreshadowing later opinions, Justice O’Connor embraced two
state interests as compelling in Wygant: remedying past or present discrimination by a state actor, and promoting racial diversity in higher education.111 Justice O’Connor wrote similarly in her dissent in United States v.
Paradise,112 calling for strict scrutiny review.113 In 1989, Justice O’Connor
garnered four votes, but still no majority of the court, to apply strict scrutiny to the city’s racial classifications in awarding construction contracts in

103. Compare Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545 (finding no discriminatory purpose and therefore no Equal
Protection Clause violation) with Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486–87 (1982)
(finding undue burden on racial minorities and therefore an Equal Protection Clause violation).
104. Washington, 458 U.S. at 491–92 (Powell, J., dissenting).
105. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s opinions in
these cases).
106. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984).
107. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
108. Id. at 283–84.
109. Id. at 285 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 286.
112. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
113. Id. at 196 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company.114 Again in 1990, in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, Justice O’Connor pressed for strict scrutiny
review of all racial classifications—even those that benefit minorities—and
was joined in her dissent by three other members of the Court.115 A majority of the Court chose instead to apply intermediate scrutiny to the federal
regulations at issue, on the basis that these regulations benefited, instead of
burdened minorities.116
In 1991, Justice O’Connor joined a majority of the Court to place a
further limit on public school desegregation plans in Board of Education of
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell.117 The Court emphasized the
intended transitory nature of desegregation decrees—that federal supervision of local school systems was intended as only a temporary measure to
remedy past discrimination.118 As a result, the Court found that where local authorities had acted in compliance with a desegregation decree and no
evidence of de jure segregation remained, the decree should be dissolved.119
However, in 1992, a majority of the Court, including Justice
O’Connor, made clear in United States v. Fordice that it had not abandoned its central holding in Brown.120 The Fordice Court noted that a state
does not discharge its constitutional obligation until it eradicates policies
and practices traceable to its prior system that continue to foster segregation, and that the adoption and implementation of race-neutral policies
alone does not suffice to demonstrate that the prior segregated system has
completely been abandoned.121 Justice O’Connor concurred in the judg-

114. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
115. 497 U.S. 547, 602–03 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Justice O’Connor was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. at 602.
116. Id. at 563. Some commentators have noted the Court’s oscillation between applying strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny review to racial classifications that benefit minorities during that
time, from Croson to Metro Broadcasting to Adarand. See generally Matthew Scutari, “The Great
Equalizer”: Making Sense of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 97 GEO. L.J. 917,
933 (2009); Dianne Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens and Equally Impartial Government, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 885, 908 (2010). Eventually, the Court settled on applying strict scrutiny review to all
race-based classifications, whether intended to be discriminatory or benign. Infra note 123 and accompanying text (noting Justice O’Connor’s success in leading the Court to apply strict scrutiny review to
all racial classifications).
117. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See infra note 119 and accompanying text (stating the Court’s holding).
118. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247–48.
119. Id. In 1992, a majority of the Court took Dowell one step further, finding that a district court
may relinquish supervision and control over a school district in incremental stages before full compliance has been achieved in every area of operations. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
120. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1992).
121. Id.
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ment, noting that it was the State’s burden to prove that it has undone its
prior segregation, which should, “by now, be only a distant memory.”122
In 1993, Justice O’Connor finally had a majority of votes from the
Court in Shaw v. Reno to impose strict scrutiny review on racial classifications.123 In Shaw, Justice O’Connor labeled the State’s reapportionment
plan, which placed into one district all individuals who belonged to the
same race but had little in common besides the color of their skin, as “political apartheid,” and she noted that the Court had rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.124 Justice O’Connor
again garnered support from a majority of the Court to impose strict scrutiny review on all racial classifications, regardless of whom they benefited,
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.125 The Adarand Court not only
overruled Metro Broadcasting, but also erased any doubt that strict scrutiny review would be applied when the government considers race.126 At the
same time, O’Connor’s majority opinion in Adarand sought to “dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” noting that
the government is not disqualified from acting in response to racial discrimination and leaving open the possibility that some race-based actions
could later be found permissible.127
By the end of the 20th century, Justice O’Connor had firmly established strict scrutiny review as the Court’s standard of review for raceconscious decision-making by state actors.128 By the time the University of
Michigan cases, Grutter v. Bollinger129 and Gratz v. Bollinger,130 reached
the Court, Justice O’Connor and a majority of the Court were poised to
strike down race-conscious acts of state officials that were not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, whether in the context of employment or education.131

122. Id. at 744–45 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
123. 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
124. Id. at 647. Justice O’Connor again applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications in the public
education context in her concurrence in Missouri v. Jenkins. 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995).
125. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 237.
128. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s majority opinions in Shaw and Adarand).
129. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
130. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
131. See supra notes 1284–128 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s adoption of strict scrutiny
review).
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1. The University of Michigan Admissions Cases
In 2003, the Court reviewed two university admissions policies from
the University of Michigan—those of the Office of Undergraduate Admissions and of the Law School.132 In these two cases, the Court applied strict
scrutiny review for the first time to race-based actions of university actors
and issued separate but closely related opinions.133
In Gratz, the Court considered the University of Michigan’s Office of
Undergraduate Admissions process, which utilized a selection index in
which an applicant could score up to 150 points.134 Each applicant received points based on high school grades and the quality of the applicant’s
high school, standardized test scores, in-state residency, alumni relationships, personal essay, personal achievement or leadership, and notably,
applicants from underrepresented minority or racial groups automatically
received twenty points.135 Writing for a majority of the Court, which included Justice O’Connor, Justice Rehnquist applied strict scrutiny to the
University’s admissions procedures and required that the University
demonstrate that their use of race was “narrowly tailored [to] further compelling government interests.”136 Justice Rehnquist recognized that diversity was a compelling interest for the University, pursuant to the Court’s
opinion in Grutter, which was decided on the same day.137 However, the
Court held that the University’s use of race in its freshman admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted compelling interest in
diversity.138 Justice O’Connor wrote separately in Gratz to note that the
weakness of the University’s admissions process was that it “did not provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants.”139
The Court considered the University of Michigan’s Law School admissions process in Grutter.140 The Law School looked for individuals with
“substantial promise for success in law school” and a “strong likelihood of
succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways,” and
they aspired to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich
everyone’s education.”141 Rather than assigning points to various applicant
132. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244 (reviewing the admissions policy of the Office of Undergraduate
Admissions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (reviewing the law school admissions policy).
133. See infra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (exploring the Court’s Grutter and Gratz opinions).
134. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 270.
137. Id. at 268.
138. Id. at 275.
139. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
140. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
141. Id. at 314–15.
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characteristics, as the Office of Undergraduate Admissions did in Gratz,
the Law School admissions policy stated that admissions officials should
“look beyond grades and test scores” to “soft variables,” such as the enthusiasm of recommenders and the diversity of the applicant.142 Utilizing this
admissions process, the Law School sought to enroll a “critical mass of
underrepresented minority students,” although it did not define the term
“critical mass” by a specific number, percentage, or range of numbers or
percentages.143
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor first noted that the Court
had last addressed the use of race in public higher education over twentyfive years before in Bakke, and that the only holding by a majority of the
Bakke Court was that states have a substantial interest that may be served
by a properly devised admissions program that involved the consideration
of race.144 In Grutter, Justice O’Connor adopted Justice Powell’s view in
Bakke that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that may
justify the use of race in university admissions.145 Recognition of this
compelling interest was not enough; Justice O’Connor then proceeded to
subject the Law School’s admissions process to strict scrutiny review.146
As a foundation for her review, Justice O’Connor asserted that “not every
decision influenced by race is equally objectionable.”147 Here, because the
Law School’s interest was not simply to assure a percentage of a particular
group within its student body merely because it its race, but to achieve the
“critical mass” necessary to provide educational benefits from diversity, 148
Justice O’Connor found the Law School’s interest compelling.149 Justice
O’Connor next looked to the means chosen to accomplish the Law
School’s interest to determine whether they were specifically and narrowly
framed to accomplish that purpose such that there was little possibility that
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.150 Further, again citing Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke, Justice
O’Connor found that for a race-conscious admissions program to be nar142. Id. at 306.
143. Id. at 318.
144. Id. at 322–23.
145. Id. at 325.
146. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
147. Id. at 327. This statement is noteworthy given that Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in
Adarand suggested that all racial classifications would be subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny
by the Court. See Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of
Texas: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 437, 453 (2011).
148. Justice O’Connor outlined the benefits of diversity touted by the University of Michigan in her
opinion. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–32.
149. Id. at 325.
150. Id. at 333.
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rowly tailored, it could not use a quota system or insulate each category of
applicants with certain qualifications from competition with all other applicants, and instead, the program must be flexible enough to consider all
elements of diversity in light of the qualifications of each applicant.151
Justice O’Connor found that the Law School’s admissions program was
this type of narrowly tailored plan because it did not operate as a quota
system; rather, each applicant was evaluated individually without giving
any race more or less weight based on their race.152 As a result, Justice
O’Connor and a majority of the Court found the Law School’s admissions
policy permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.153
Despite upholding the Law School’s admissions process in Grutter,
Justice O’Connor noted that race-conscious admissions policies must be
limited in time, as the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race.154 O’Connor suggested that this durational requirement may be met
in the context of higher education by sunset provisions in race-conscious
admissions processes and periodic reviews to determine whether racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve diversity, and further, she noted
that universities should draw on the most promising aspects of race-neutral
alternatives as they develop.155 Finally, Justice O’Connor and the majority
of the Court noted their expectation that twenty-five years from the date of
their opinion—by 2028—“the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest [in diversity].”156
Together, Grutter and Gratz made clear that the Court had joined Justice O’Connor’s commitment to both remedying past government discrimination on the basis of race and in ensuring that any current race-based
decision-making by state actors must survive strict review.157 Consequently, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Court’s jurisprudence
seemed to embrace only a very small number of government uses of
race.158

151. Id. at 334.
152. Id. at 335–36.
153. Id. at 343.
154. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342–43.
155. Id. at 342.
156. Id. at 343; see also Gerald Torres, We Are on the Move, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 355, 361
(2010).
157. See supra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (exploring Grutter and Gratz).
158. See supra Section III–IV(B) (tracing the Court’s race and education jurisprudence).
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2. After Grutter v. Bollinger
In 2005, the Court again reaffirmed the application of strict scrutiny
review to race-conscious state actions in Johnson v. California.159 Writing
for the majority, Justice O’Connor applied strict scrutiny review to a prison’s policy of placing new or transferred inmates with cellmates of the
same race.160 Instead of quickly resolving Johnson on the historical deference given to the needs of prison administrators, as urged by the dissent,
Justice O’Connor reaffirmed the Court’s prior holdings that all racial classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny,
regardless of the motive behind the classification,161 and remanded the case
to the district court to apply strict scrutiny review.162
By the time Justice O’Connor retired from the Court in 2005, the
Court’s application of strict scrutiny review to all race-conscious decisionmaking by state actors was clear.163 In the context of education, it was
evident that the government might successfully offer two different compelling interests to withstand this scrutiny—remedying past discrimination
and achieving diversity of a critical mass through university admissions.164
However, government’s actions to achieve these compelling interests must
be narrowly tailored, and only few race-conscious actions would withstand
this degree of heightened scrutiny by the Court.165
V. ANALYSIS
Justice O’Connor served on the Court during a fundamentally transformative time in the nation’s history, as the Court struggled to define the
tangible meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of education.166 At a superficial review, it is clear that Justice O’Connor shepherded strict scrutiny judicial review of race-conscious decision-making by
government actors from a minority view to the view of a majority of the
Court.167 However, Justice O’Connor’s influence on the Court’s race and
159. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
160. Id. at 502, 509.
161. Compare id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting) with id. at 509 (O’Connor, J.).
162. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515.
163. See supra Section IV (noting the consistent application of strict scrutiny by the Court).
164. See supra notes 111 and 145 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s embrace of these compelling interests).
165. See supra Section IV (making note of the Court’s application of strict scrutiny review).
166. See supra Section IV (highlighting the Court’s race and education jurisprudence during Justice
O’Connor’s tenure).
167. See supra Section IV (highlighting the Court’s race and education jurisprudence during Justice
O’Connor’s tenure).
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education jurisprudence stretches much further, as this section will illustrate.168 This section will address: (A) the state of the law after Grutter,
(B) the Court’s jurisprudence after Justice O’Connor’s tenure, and (C) the
future of race-conscious decision-making in education and Justice
O’Connor’s legacy in this area.
A. State of the Law after Grutter
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter was the culmination of
many years of addressing race in the context of education during her tenure
on the Court.169 As such, it should serve as the basis for review of Justice
O’Connor’s impact on this area of the Court’s jurisprudence. As will be
discussed in this section, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter established
three principles: (1) diversity in education is a compelling government
interest; (2) although university admissions policies must be narrowly tailored to survive judicial review, universities have a significant degree of
autonomy to adopt standards consistent with their educational mission; and
(3) Grutter’s holding will expire in twenty-five years from its issuance.
1. Diversity as a Compelling Interest
The Court’s clear embrace in Grutter of diversity as a compelling interest for purposes of Equal Protection analysis in higher education cases
was built on a growing notion in the Court’s jurisprudence that education
must prepare students for the diverse world they were certain to encounter
as an adult.170 Justice O’Connor garnered five votes for this diversity rationale in Grutter, a significant change from support of this rationale by
only Justice Powell in Bakke.171 Instead of aiming merely to eliminate
racial discrimination through conscious placement of students, an interest
in diversity aims to achieve a student body of varied ethnicities for the
purpose of educating all students so that they each may be better prepared
for the world.172 Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter includes several
assertions to this effect as proof of the compelling nature of universities
achieving diversity,173 and it is not difficult to imagine that Justice
168. See infra Section V(A) (analyzing Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter and other cases).
169. See supra Section IV (tracing the Court’s race and education jurisprudence during Justice
O’Connor’s tenure through her opinions).
170. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324, 330–31.
171. Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative
Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1147 (2009).
172. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32 (discussing the benefits of achieving diversity in higher education).
173. Supra note 148.
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O’Connor understood and appreciated diversity from her own experiences
as well. Justice O’Connor’s exposure to individuals of different races as a
child at Lazy B and her experiences at Stanford as one of only a small percentage of female law students perhaps led her to not only appreciate learning from diverse individuals, but to view the experiences of individuals
with different backgrounds as necessary to a good education.174
Some legal scholars have praised Grutter’s embrace of diversity as a
compelling interest as a “win-win for universities,” as universities relying
on diversity are not forced to show evidence of their own past racial discrimination and rarely must state the characteristics that qualify or disqualify applicants.175 Further, while traditional affirmative action programs
appear more exclusive, seeming to demand that people acknowledge and
assume responsibility for a history of racial oppression, diversity initiatives
seem to lack a remedial component and suggest a more forward-looking
orientation.176 As a result, the word diversity appears more inclusive, and a
wider range of society can envision themselves as beneficiaries of programs aimed at achieving diversity.177
Although Justice O’Connor clearly embraced diversity as a compelling
interest, her majority opinion in Grutter left murky the distinction between
remedial measures and diversity measures.178 Her opinion generally
avoided traditional remediation rhetoric and instead touted the benefits of
diversity, but at the same time spoke of time limits for universities’ abilities to utilize race-conscious admissions programs, suggesting that the
State’s interest was remedial.179 In particular, Justice O’Connor’s statement that the university’s diversity plan would no longer be justified twenty-five years after the Court’s opinion suggests that the Court upheld the
admissions plan as a remedial measure, instead of as a means to ensure the
student body diversity necessary to provide a sound university education.180 As a result, while Grutter clearly embraced diversity as a compelling interest in higher education, it is not clear whether the Court truly relied on this interest to uphold the University’s admissions process, and as
such, whether an interest in diversity alone can justify future race174. See supra Section II (discussing Justice O’Connor’s childhood experiences and education).
175. West-Faulcon, supra note 171, at 1147–48.
176. Barnes, supra note 91, at 1001–02.
177. See Barnes, supra note 91, at 1002 (describing diversity as “a source of relief for racial inequality”).
178. Compare supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that the Grutter Court embraced diversity as a compelling interest) with Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Argot of Equality: On the Importance of Disentangling “Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for Race-Conscious Government Action, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 907, 918 (2010) (asserting that Grutter was based on both diversity and remediation interests).
179. Krotoszynski, supra note 178, at 918.
180. Id.at 935–36.
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conscious decision-making in higher education.181 Finally, to further
weaken diversity as a reliable compelling interest for race-based measures,
today Grutter remains the lone Court decision to which proponents of diversity can cite.182
2. Narrowly Tailored, but not Fatal in Fact
By the time Grutter and Gratz reached the Court, it was clear that strict
scrutiny review would be applied to all racial classifications by state actors
and would require that the state’s actions be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest.183 Justice O’Connor garnered a majority
of votes from the Court to apply strict scrutiny in Shaw v. Reno,184 and the
Court had applied strict scrutiny in each subsequent encounter of racial
classifications.185 Consequently, it is not surprising that in Grutter, the
Court required that the University of Michigan’s admissions policy be narrowly tailored to its interest in achieving student body diversity.
Justice O’Connor utilized the opportunity that Grutter offered to clarify what narrowly tailored entails in the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis. 186
Justice O’Connor defined the Court’s narrowly tailored test as requiring
that “[t]he means chosen to accomplish the government’s asserted purpose
must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose” and
that “the means chosen [must] fit . . . so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate.”187 This
elaboration on the Court’s narrowly tailored review suggested that few, if
any, governmental actions that employ racial classifications will fit closely
enough with the state’s compelling interest to pass constitutional muster.
However, other parts of Justice O’Connor’s opinion indicated that the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny is not intended to make judicial review “fatal in fact”188 and that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”189 This suggests

181. Supra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
182. Thompson, supra note 147, at 475.
183. See supra Section IV (exploring the evolution of the Court’s race jurisprudence and adoption of
strict scrutiny review).
184. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
185. Supra notes 124–162 and accompanying text.
186. Infra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. The Court did not expound upon the “narrowly
tailored” requirement in Shaw and Adarand; instead, the Court remanded both cases to the lower courts
to apply the strict scrutiny analysis. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238–39
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
187. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
188. Id. at 326.
189. Id. at 339.
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that state actors have a significant degree of latitude for race-based decision-making in education.
Because the education context influenced the Court in articulating the
constitutionally required fit necessary in Grutter, the special characteristics
of education identified by Justice O’Connor are worth noting.190 For Justice O’Connor in Grutter, academic freedom had been historically viewed
as a special concern of the First Amendment,191 and there was a tradition of
giving deference to a university’s academic decisions.192 In fact, while the
Court noted that deference would only be given within the bounds of constitutional limits, it openly deferred to the Law School’s “educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission.”193
Because the Law School’s admissions policy was not an outright quota
system of the type rejected in Bakke and because the Law School claimed
that its admissions process left ample opportunity for individualized review, the Grutter Court found that it was narrowly tailored to the Law
School’s interest in diversity in education.194 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued in dissent, the Law School presented little concrete evidence to
demonstrate exactly how race factored into both individual admissions and
the Law School admissions as a whole.195 Such deference to the Law
School suggests that the Court’s strict scrutiny review in race-based decision-making is perhaps much less rigorous in education contexts than strict
scrutiny, as defined, might suggest.196 As a result, it is questionable
whether Justice O’Connor in fact left the Court with strict scrutiny—
requiring ends narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest—firmly
intact as the proper standard of review in all racial classifications by state
actors.
3. A Twenty-Five Year Expiration for Grutter
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter is frequently cited for her declaration that “25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved [in Grutter].”197 Her assertion
190. Infra notes 191–193 and accompanying text.
191. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324.
192. Id. at 328; see also generally Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217 (2011)
(discussing Grutter’s impact on deference to university officials).
193. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
194. Id. at 334–39.
195. Id. at 379–87.
196. Mark S. Kende, Reviving Pragmatism in Constitutional Law: U.S. Opportunities and South
African Examples, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 679, 695 (2010).
197. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1369 (2010);
Torres, supra note 156, at 361.
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was based on the premise that race-conscious programs require a termination point in order to assure that differing from the norm of equal treatment
is only a temporary practice,198 and arguably, is based on an underlying
commitment to equality unhampered by race that is greater than an appreciation for diversity. This underlying value judgment is expected to the
extent that Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter was shaped by
her own experiences.199 While Justice O’Connor benefited and learned
from exposure to workers of differing backgrounds during her time at Lazy
B, her ability to receive a legal education equal to that of her male peers
and her own struggle with obtaining an equal employment opportunity
after graduation from law school likely had a greater impact on her life.
As such, it would not be surprising if she intended Grutter to embrace ultimate equality as a greater concern than achieving diversity.
As evidenced by the several references to Justice O’Connor’s statement by the rest of the Court, it is unclear whether this termination point
was intended as an expectation, a limitation, or a mere hopeful projection.200 Regardless of the intent behind this statement, the Court is sure to
be faced with a strong argument in 2028, twenty-five years after Grutter,
that race-conscious programs can no longer be upheld.201
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence After Justice O’Connor’s Tenure
In 2007, following Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the Court reviewed
the proper role for race in the education context in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.202 Consequently, Parents Involved offers the best foundation for determining the holding power
of Justice O’Connor’s contributions to race and education jurisprudence.
This section will address: (1) the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved and
(2) how Parents Involved changed the Court’s race and education jurisprudence.
1. Parents Involved in Community Schools
In Parents Involved, the Court faced the question of whether a public
school that had not operated segregated schools or found to be unitary may
198. LaCroix, supra note 197, at 1369.
199. See Joyce, supra note 19 (suggesting such a connection); see also Christopher E. Smith, Justice
John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender of Miranda Rights, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 99, 106 (2010) (quoting
Justice O’Connor) (“We bring whatever we are as people to a job like the Supreme Court.”).
200. LaCroix, supra note 197, at 1370–71.
201. Id. at 1371 (“[W]ith the tolling of the twenty-five year period . . . the era of race-conscious
admissions policies in higher education will come to an end.”).
202. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments.203
The Parents Involved Court based their analysis on the “well established” proposition that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action will be reviewed under strict scrutiny.204 In order to satisfy this standard of review,
the Court noted that the school districts must demonstrate that the use of
individual racial classifications is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.205 In Parents Involved, the Court took these
principles as firmly established truths of constitutional law, citing to Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter and other cases.206 Before analyzing
the school district plans, the Court also noted that they had only recognized
two interests as compelling to justify race-based decision-making.207 First,
the Court identified remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination as a compelling interest, but only where the harm being remedied by a
mandatory desegregation plan is the harm traceable to segregation, not
mere racial imbalance.208 Second, the Court pointed again to Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter and noted a very specific interest in student
body diversity in the context of higher education, focused not on race
alone, but encompassing all factors that may contribute to student body
diversity.209 Finally, in Parents Involved, the Court made clear that racial
balancing can never be a compelling state interest.210
In Parents Involved, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the school district’s racial classifications, first determining whether the state had a compelling interest in this case.211 The Court rejected diversity as an interest in
the case before it because the school district had not considered race as part
of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints,” as the University of Michigan Law School had in
Grutter.212 Instead, for some students, race alone was determinative. 213
203. Id. at 711.
204. Id. at 720 (citing, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326).
205. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
206. Id. at 720.
207. Id. at 720–22.
208. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720–21 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S 467, 494 (1992); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
209. Id. at 722. The Court noted that “[t]he entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admissions program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of
a particular racial group.” Id.
210. Id. at 730–31 (citing Grutter for the proposition that outright racial balancing is “patently unconstitutional”).
211. Id. at 720.
212. Id. at 723.
213. Id. The Court found the Seattle School District’s plan more akin to the admissions program
struck down in Gratz, instead of the meaningful, individualized review upheld in Grutter. Id.
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Further, the considerations unique to higher education outlined by the
Court in Grutter were not present here.214 As a result, in Parents Involved,
the Court found that the present case was not governed by Grutter, and
diversity did not lie as a valid compelling interest for the state.215 Out of
the several offered interests, the Court found that only the school district’s
interest in remedying past discrimination was compelling.216
The Court then subjected the school district’s actions to strict scrutiny,
noting that the school district seeking a “worthy” goal did not mean that
their racial classifications would be subject to less exacting scrutiny.217
The Court found that the school district’s actions were not narrowly tailored to achieving its interest, as the “minimal effect” of student assignments suggested that other means would be effective and the district failed
to show “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.”218 The Court not only based both of these considerations on Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter, but also compared the facts before
them to those found to support the constitutionality of the University of
Michigan Law School’s admissions process.219 Finally, the Court ended its
opinion with the strong assertion that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”220
2. How Parents Involved Changed Race and Education Jurisprudence
The Court reaffirmed the central holdings of Grutter in Parents Involved, as the Court held that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of
review to apply to the plaintiff’s claims of state classifications based on
race, and that only two state interests could be compelling: remedying the
effects of past intentional discrimination and ensuring diversity, but only in
higher education.221
However, the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved seemed to limit the
availability of diversity as a compelling interest, repeatedly noting that
Grutter embraced diversity only in the context of higher education, and
declining to allow diversity as a compelling interest in secondary education

214. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724–26.
215. Id. at 725.
216. Id. at 720–21, 731–32. It should be noted that the Court found that only the Jefferson City
school district’s interest in remedying past discrimination was compelling, as there was no evidence of
past intentional discrimination in the Seattle school district. Id.
217. Id. at 743.
218. Id. at 734–36.
219. Id.
220. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
221. Michael P. Pohorylo, Note, The Role of Parents Involved in the College Admissions Process, 42
CONN. L. REV. 693, 714 (2009).
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cases.222 At the same time, Parents Involved did little to address the constitutional line between remedial efforts and proactive measures to achieve
diversity, leaving diversity as a nebulous but possibly legitimate state interest.223
The Court emphasized two reasons why the secondary school assignment plans were not narrowly tailored, and as such, not constitutional: the
two reassignment plans only had a marginal impact in achieving diverse
student bodies, and the school district showed no evidence of consideration
of alternatives that were not based on race.224
Because courts often find holdings involving K-12 education instructive in cases where one party is a university or college, and give similar
treatment in the reverse, Parents Involved can be viewed together with
Grutter to determine the Court’s current race and education jurisprudence.225 To the extent that Grutter and Parents Involved may be viewed
together, the Court has added additional requirements to racial classifications that wish to pass constitutional muster. First, racial classifications
must show significant measurable success.226 Minor gains in creating a
diverse student body will not survive strict scrutiny.227 Second, if favorable race-neutral alternatives exist, then a plan that employs the use of race
is not narrowly tailored.228 State actors must clearly prove their consideration of such alternatives as well as provide evidence to the court that raceneutral alternatives are not favorable.229 These requirements arguably signal that the current Court has grown increasingly reluctant to continue its
typical deference to affirmative action in higher education.230
The number of cases filed by plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination
against students has been limited since Parents Involved was decided in
2007, and lower courts facing such claims have ruled consistent with the

222. Ellison S. Ward, Toward Constitutional Minority Recruitment and Retention Programs: A
Narrowly Tailored Approach, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 609, 628 (2009).
223. Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 918.
224. Pohorylo, supra note 222, at 714-15.
225. Id. at 715–16. But see Coal. for Equity & Excellence in Maryland Higher Educ., Inc. v. Md.
Higher Educ. Comm’n, CIV.A. CCB-06-2773, 2011 WL 2217481 (D. Md. June 6, 2011) ) (analyzing
plaintiff’s claim of Title VII violations in higher education under United States v. Fordice and Grutter,
without mention of Parents Involved); Pohorylo, supra note 222, at 716 (“Grutter is still good law and
the holding of Parents Involved has not been incorporated into higher education and will not be a part
of higher education law until a case is before the courts which warrants its application.”).
226. Pohorylo, supra note 222, at 716–17.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 717–18.
229. Id. at 718.
230. Kimberly A. Pacelli, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Navigating the Narrows between
Grutter and Parents Involved, 63 ME. L. REV. 569, 570 (2011).
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Court’s jurisprudence.231 For instance, in 2009, the Sixth Circuit noted that
the Court has held that the “transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end” of its desegregation jurisprudence, and that once the effects of prior discrimination have been cured,
race-conscious federal judicial supervision of the school district ends. 232
The Sixth Circuit overwhelmingly echoed the sentiment of the Parents
Involved Court in its opinion.233 Similarly, in 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied strict scrutiny to
the plaintiffs’ allegation that they were unable to choose between two high
schools as a result of their race.234 The district court echoed the Court’s
jurisprudence that disparate impact alone is not enough to show violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, and the existence of one primarily black
high school may be acceptable if it results from the desire to meet raceneutral, compelling interests.235 As a result, Parents Involved remains the
final word in the Court’s race and education jurisprudence.236
The Parents Involved Court based much of its opinion on Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter and similar prior holdings of the
Court that embraced strict scrutiny judicial review.237 At the same time,
Parents Involved constrained the central holding of Grutter to a very narrow context, as the Court found that diversity could be compelling only in
the context of higher education.238 As a result, Justice O’Connor’s contribution to the Court’s race and education jurisprudence remained strong,
but narrowed, after the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved.

231. See infra notes 232–132 (discussing various post-Parents Involved cases); Pohorylo, supra note
222, at 722–23
232. Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Fell v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 2010-CA-001830-MR, 2011 WL 4502673 at *1-2, 8 (Ky. Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 2011) (noting that federal supervision ends when the effects of prior discrimination have been
cured). Cf. Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that
the district court could not abdicate its responsibility to retain jurisdiction until the school district both
demonstrated good faith and eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable).
233. Robinson, 566 F.3d at 656.
234. Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 09-2095, 2010 WL 2595278, at *1, *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 24, 2010).
235. Id. at *2–3; see also Everett v. Juvenile Female 1, 6:69-CV-702-H, 2011 WL 3606539, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2011) (“The fact that the plan results in schools that do not reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole does not mean that the plan is unconstitutional.”).
236. See Jacob E. Meusch, Note, Equal Education Opportunity and the Pursuit of “Just Schools”:
The Des Moines Independent Community School District Rethinks Diversity and the Meaning of “Minority Student,” 95 IOWA L. REV. 1341, 1350 (2010) (“Parents Involved represents the most recent
major decision regarding the issue of school desegregation”).
237. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007)
(citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).
238. Id. at 724-25.
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C. The Future of Race-Conscious Decision-Making in Education
Equality has been a shifting concept throughout the history of the
United States.239 The Court’s jurisprudence has consistently evolved over
time to address shifting notions of equality, sharpening the promise of the
Equal Protection Clause,240 particularly in the area of race and education.241
As such, Justice O’Connor’s impact on the Court’s race and education jurisprudence cannot only be measured through Parents Involved; rather, we
must consider her legacy in the context of both cases currently pending and
the perception of race in our society today.
1. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
The Fifth Circuit ruled on the University of Texas’ race-conscious admissions policy in early 2011 in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,242
attracting nationwide attention once again to the use of race in university
admissions.243 Petition for certiorari was granted by the Court on February
21, 2012, and the Court will hear oral arguments in the fall of 2012 after
briefs are filed during the summer of 2012.244 Commentators have noted
that Fisher provides the Court with the opportunity to revisit Grutter and
will be the next “big” case in the Court’s race and education jurisprudence.245
239. Barnes, supra note 92, at 968.
240. Nicholas F. Brescia, Modernizing State Voting Laws that Disenfranchise the Mentally Disabled
with the Aid of Past Suffrage Movements, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 943, 948–49 (2010) (citing the Court’s
use in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966) of the strict scrutiny test
for laws limiting an individual’s right to vote).
241. Cf. Pacelli, supra note 231, at 570 (describing jurisprudence regarding the use of race in college
admissions as having a “long and complex history”).
242. 631 F.3d 213, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 11-345, 2012 WL 538328 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2012).
243. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Fifth Circuit Approves Race-Based Admissions at Univ. of Texas,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/19/fifth-circuit-approves-racebased-admissions-at-univ-of-texas/. The United States and twenty-eight other organizations participated as amicus curiae before the Fifth Circuit, and many are expected to similarly participate before the
Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL
4352286, at *4 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2011).
244. See Supreme Court of the United States, Docket File for Fisher v. University of Texas,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm (noting that Petition
was granted on February 21, 2012, the time to file petitioner’s brief on the merits is extended to and
includes May 21, 2012, and the time to file respondents’ brief on the merits is extended to and includes
August 6, 2012); Lyle Denniston, Affirmative Action Review Due Next Term, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21,
2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=139196 (noting that Fisher “will go over for argument
in the next Term, starting October 1”).
245. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 147, at 440; Mike Sacks, Is the End Near for Affirmative Action?, FIRST ONE @ ONE FIRST (Jan. 18, 2011), https://f11f.wordpress.com/2011/01/18/is-the-end-nearfor-affirmative-action/. Some have noted that Fisher provides the first opportunity since Parents
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In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a diversity initiative that guarantees admission to public Texas universities and colleges to Texas students
graduating in the top ten percent of their high school class (the “Top Ten
Percent Law”).246 Those students who are not given automatic admission
under the Top Ten Percent Law compete for admission to the University of
Texas based on their Academic and Personal Achievement Indices, which
not only makes note of the applicant’s race,247 but also considers it as a
factor for admission.248 The University of Texas admissions plan went
considerably further than merely seeking diversity across the entering class
of students; the plan also sought to achieve diversity among major fields of
study and at the classroom level.249 Abigail Fisher and Rachel Micalewicz,
both Texas residents, were denied undergraduate admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the class entering in fall 2008.250 Fisher and
Micalewicz filed suit alleging that the admissions policies of the University
of Texas discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of
their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.251 The
district court granted summary judgment to the University.252
Echoing much of the Court’s opinion in Grutter, the Fifth Circuit held
in Fisher that the University’s admissions policy was narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest in achieving diversity in a critical mass, rather than outright racial balancing.253 Notably, the Fifth Circuit read the
Court’s jurisprudence to require scrutiny of the University’s decision making process only “to ensure that its decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions policy followed from the good faith consideration Grutter requires,” rather than “second-guess[ing] the merits of the University’s decision.”254 Applying this deference, the Fifth Circuit found no indication that
the university did not act in good faith by designing an admissions policy

Involved “to explore what that case might mean for university admissions.” Pacelli, supra note 231, at
571.
246. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 216-17, 224.
247. Id.at 227–28.
248. Id. at 226. An applicant’s “Personal Achievement” score considers their “special circumstances,” such as leadership qualities, socioeconomic status, and their race. Id. at 228. The amount of points
that an applicant may earn based on their race is not specified; rather, the applicant’s file is viewed
“holistically.” Id.
249. Denniston, supra note 245.
250. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 217.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 247. The Fifth Circuit discussed at length the Court’s findings in Grutter both that diversity in higher constitutes a compelling interest and that consideration of race must be individualized and
flexible. Id. at 220–21.
254. Id. at 231.
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modeled after that in Grutter, and as such, it passed constitutional muster.255
However, Fifth Circuit Justice Emilio Garza noted in his Fisher concurrence that the deference the Fifth Circuit gave to the University of Texas in following Grutter did not follow the Court’s traditional application of
strict scrutiny to race-conscious decision-making.256 In Judge Garza’s
view, the use of phrases like “individualized consideration” and “holistic
review” merely cloud the reality that race is used in essentially the same
way as it is in rigid quota systems.257 As a result, “race now matters in
university admissions, where, if strict judicial scrutiny were properly applied, it should not.”258
As noted, the Court granted certiorari in Fisher on February 21,
2012,259 and certified the following question: whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter, permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of
race in undergraduate admissions decisions.260 While the stated issue before the Court is whether the University of Texas may continue to use its
current admissions policy, Grutter’s validity is in danger as well.261 Scholars have aptly noted that the facts of Fisher expose the contradictory holdings of Grutter and Parents Involved: whereas Grutter holds that universities “need not exhaust” race-neutral alternatives before using racial classifications, Parents Involved requires that racial classifications only be used
as a “last resort.”262 As such, the Court is faced with reconciling Grutter’s
embrace of a deferential review of race-conscious university admissions
programs that is justified by an interest in diversity with the Court’s otherwise strong embrace of strict scrutiny in all race based state actions.263 In
255. Id. at 247.
256. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 247 (Garza, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 252.
258. Id. at 247.
259. Supra note 244 and accompanying text.
260. See Docket File for Fisher v. University of Texas, Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm.
261. Amy Howe, This Week’s Grants: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2012, 11:39 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/this-week’s-grants-in-plain-english/; see Jeffrey Toobin, The
Other Big Supreme Court Case, THE NEW YORKER BLOG (May 1, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/
online/blogs/comment/2012/05/the-other-big-supreme-court-case.html (stating that “[t]he case amounts
to a direct challenge to [Grutter]”). Some scholars have alternatively argued that the Court is not
necessarily faced with overruling Grutter in Fisher, but instead, Fisher provides the Court with the
opportunity to strike down the University of Texas’ admissions policy as a “runaway expansion” of
Grutter while reaffirming the central holding of Grutter. See Brief of Amici Curiae California Association of Scholars and Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v.
University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 4352286 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2011), 2011 WL 5007902.
262. Pacelli, supra note 231, at 589.
263. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL
4352286, at *24 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2011) (noting the Court’s history of holding that “governmental racial
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addition, the composition of the Court deciding Fisher is markedly different than the Court that ruled on Grutter. Three of the Justices who dissented in Grutter—Justices Kennedy,264 Scalia and Thomas—continue to be
firmly opposed to affirmative action, as does Justice Roberts, who succeeded the fourth dissenter in Grutter, Justice Rehnquist.265 In addition,
the author of the Court’s opinion in Grutter, Justice O’Connor, has been
replaced by Justice Alito, who is more likely to find the University of Texas’ policy unconstitutional than his predecessor.266 Finally, Justice Kagan
has recused herself from Fisher,267 leaving Justices Sotomayor, Breyer and
Ginsburg as the only members of the Court who are consistent supporters
of affirmative action and can be counted on to uphold Grutter’s legacy.268
As such, Justice O’Connor’s legacy in this area will surely be tested in
Fisher.269
b. Race in America Today
Beginning with Grutter, the Court limited the consideration of race in
university admissions and secondary school integration plans.270 As a result, legal scholars have argued that these and subsequent cases signal a
return to post-racial ideology and analysis, where race-based decisionmaking is no longer warranted because racial discrimination no longer
exists.271 Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter that race-conscious soclassifications demand the most exacting judicial examination”) (internal citations omitted) with infra
Section IV(A)(a) and accompanying text (discussing Grutter).
264. Justice Kennedy dissented from Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion, and again in Parents Involved, expressing negative sentiments about the very concept of remedial racial preferences. See
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[M]easures other than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first
must be exhausted.”); Scott A. Moss, The Courts Under President Obama, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 727,
734 (2009); Pacelli, supra note 231, at 577 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s vote will be crucial in future
cases); see also Corrada, supra note 8, at 242 (noting that Justice Kennedy “has adopted key elements
of Justice O’Connor’s position on affirmative action: hostile and restrictive, yes, but not entirely opposed to it as are the more conservative members of the Court.”).
265. Howe, supra note 262.
266. Id. Justice Alito signaled opposition to any consideration of race in Parents Involved. Moss,
supra note 265, at 734.
267. Lyle Denniston, Affirmative Action Review Due Next Term, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2012, 4:38
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=139196.
268. See Toobin, supra note 262 (stating “[t]hat leaves only three Democratic appointees—Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor—as likely votes in favor of affirmative action”).
269. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 264 (Garza, J., concurring); see Toobin, supra note 262 (stating that Grutter
was the “most famous decision authored by Sandra Day O’Connor”).
270. See Barnes, supra note 92, at 972 (noting the post-racial ideology of the Court after Grutter).
271. Barnes, supra note 92, at 972. Barnes points to Parents Involved as a judicial assertion that the
Equal Protection Clause requires colorblindness and bars any effort at race-based remedies for discrimination and segregation. Id. at 974.
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lutions should end twenty-five years after that decision embraces this postracial ideology,272 as does Justice Garza’s concurrence in Fisher. Proponents of affirmative action argue that the Court’s growing tendency to accept post-racial ideology ignore the ways in which racism has been ingrained, and continues to produce effects, in systems and structures of the
United States.273 They note that while post-racialism emphasizes stories of
individual success, it does not adequately account for the disparate conditions under which minorities struggle that cause minorities to compare
unfavorably to whites among almost all measures of economic and social
success.274 Consequently, proponents of affirmative action argue that the
Court’s growing adoption of post-racialism “ignores how race operates”
and does not go far enough to achieve equality.275 While Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter suggests that diversity will remain a compelling state interest in higher education and that programs that consider
applicants’ diversity as one factor in making admissions decisions will
remain valid for another twenty years, the adoption of post-racialism by
several sitting Justices suggests that the Court will soon, perhaps as early
as within the next year through Fisher, reject race-based remedies in all but
the most egregious intentional discrimination cases.276
Not only is the present Court poised to strike down any use of affirmative action measures in university admissions, but opponents of affirmative
action are waging an increasingly vocal national battle over race-conscious
admissions, not only in the courts, but also through state ballot initiatives.277 To comply with these initiatives, many public universities have
eliminated affirmative action policies, which has resulted in a negative
impact on admissions rates for minorities.278 However, these actions may

272. Barnes, supra note 92, at 975.
273. Id. at 979; see also Destiny Perry, The Colorblind Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality: The Case
for a New Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 473 (2011) (arguing that “race
consciousness in the law is necessary to ensure equal treatment of racial groups in regulated domains
such as . . . education”).
274. Barnes, supra note 92, at 983. Barnes notes discrepancies in the poverty rate, income and
wealth, homeownership, employment, education, and criminal justice statistics. Id. at 984–992.
275. Barnes, supra note 92, at 995. But see Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 925 (acknowledging the
pre-university experiences of minorities).
276. Barnes, supra note 92, at 996–97.
277. West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078. These include California’s Proposition 209, Washington’s Initiative 200, Michigan’s Proposal 2, and Nebraska’s Initiative 424. Id. After initiatives were
passed in these states, the states passed laws that prohibit public universities from discriminating or
giving preference on the basis of race. Id. at 1086. The Sixth Circuit heard an Equal Protection challenge to Michigan’s Proposal 2 in 2011. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equal. by any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 652
F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Sept. 9, 2011).
278. Ward, supra note 223, at 631; West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078. For example, UC Berkley admitted fewer than half the number of African American and Latino students during the first
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constitute violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits universities from using admissions criteria that result in discrimination against applicants on the basis of race.279 Further, declining levels
of minorities admitted arguably constitutes proof that the seemingly raceblind university admissions process actually discriminates against minorities.280 In addition, many universities that have removed race as a factor in
admissions decisions have created programs designed to increase racial
diversity through recruiting and retaining minority students.281 Proponents
of these programs argue that they are both necessary to ensure minority
representation within their universities and are narrowly tailored to achieve
the state’s compelling interest in diversity.282 However, there is a strong
argument that not only do these types of minority recruitment and retention
programs cause a detriment to non-minority students, as they utilize university resources that might be used in ways not based on race and provide
unfair advantages to minority students,283 but also that they do more harm
than good.284 As a result, the Court is not only poised to strike down the
use of race in university admissions, but the climate is ripe for the right
case to come before the Court for such an outcome that diminishes Justice
O’Connor’s legacy in this area.285
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court’s race and education jurisprudence has come a long way
from its embrace of the “separate but equal” doctrine in education before
admissions cycle without use of affirmative action than the university had admitted the prior year. Id.
at 1094.
279. West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078. For discussion supporting the idea that such initiatives
are unconstitutional, see Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by any Means Necessary (BAMN), 652 F.3d at 610.
280. West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078–79. For such a claim to succeed, the plaintiff would not
only need to show decreased admissions, but that the selection process is discriminatory, whether in
fact or in impact. Id. at 1095.
281. Ward, supra note 223, at 611. But see id. at 622 (noting that Grutter has led some institutions to
“make extremely conservative choices that have limited or ended important recruitment and retention
efforts”).
282. Ward, supra note 223, at 611–12. For exploration of these types of minority recruitment and
retention programs, see generally id.
283. Ward, supra note 223, at 640–41.
284. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gail Heriot et al. in Support of the Petitioner, Fisher v. University of
Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 4352286 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 5007903, at *4 (arguing that
race-preferential admissions have not facilitated the entry of minorities into higher education and highprestige careers); Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 4352286 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2011), 2011 WL
5015112, at *4–5 (asserting that that racial preference programs in universities have not proven to
benefit minorities).
285. Moss, supra note 265, at 733–34.
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Brown v. Board of Education.286 A child can no longer be turned away
from a school simply because of his race, and public universities openly
aim for a racially diverse student body.287 Any consideration of race in
government decision making is now met with strict scrutiny,288 and the
current Court has expressed a strong commitment to colorblindness.289
Much of this transformation in the Court’s race and education jurisprudence occurred during Justice O’Connor’s tenure on the Court, largely
due to both Justice O’Connor’s influence on her fellow Justices and her
firm commitment to both equality and the right of each student to receive
an excellent and diverse education.290 Her majority opinion in Grutter was
a clear statement by the Court that not only would every race-conscious
decision made by state actors undergo strict judicial scrutiny, but that public universities have a compelling interest in achieving a diverse student
body.291 To date, Grutter remains the central holding of the Court’s race
and education jurisprudence.292
As the Court is faced with claims challenging school placement
schemes that consider race or university admissions processes that seek
diverse applicants, particularly in Fisher, Justice O’Connor’s race and education framework in Grutter is sure to be challenged.293 These cases will
be the ultimate measure of Justice O’Connor’s influence on the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area. For now, perhaps it is enough to note that if
nothing else, the first female Justice, from humble beginnings on a remote
cattle ranch in Arizona, significantly altered the educational opportunities
available in this nation for many.294

286. See supra notes 48–64 and accompanying text (outlining the Court’s race and education jurisprudence before Brown).
287. See supra Section IV (exploring part of the Court’s jurisprudence after Brown, specifically
during Justice O’Connor’s tenure on the Court).
288. See supra Section IV (tracing the Court’s adoption of strict scrutiny review for all racial classifications).
289. Campbell, supra note 5, at 421 (noting a majority of the present Court’s commitment to colorblindness).
290. See supra Section IV (exploring Justice O’Connor’s race and education jurisprudence).
291. See supra Section V(A) (analyzing Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter).
292. Supra Section V (noting Grutter’s legacy).
293. See, e.g., supra Section V(C) (discussing the challenge to Grutter by Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin).
294. See supra Section V(A) (exhibiting Justice O’Connor’s impact on the Court’s race and education jurisprudence).

